Category: Regulations & Compliance

By Trevor Howe, Senior Operational Resilience Consultant

 

China’s imposition of export controls earlier this month on two strategic raw materials could have significant implications for Western manufacturers of electric cars, smartphones and a host of other advanced technology products.

 

The restrictions require Chinese firms to attain special permits from the government to ship gallium  and germanium out of the country. Gallium compounds are commonly used in the manufacture of semiconductors, defense systems, medical devices and solar cells, while germanium is most often used in fiber optics.

 

Both the United States and the European Union (E.U.) are heavily reliant upon China as a source of these two critical commodities (see table below). So the Chinese government’s move could undermine global supply chains and increase the potential for disruption.

 

In the short term, these new export controls may add upward pressure to commodity prices in anticipation of constricted supplies to global markets. In the medium to long term, they could further accelerate moves in multiple countries to diversify the raw material supply chain away from China.

 

U.S. and E.U. Dependence on China for Gallium (Ga) and Germanium (Ge)

 

	Net Reliance on Imports for Ga	Import Reliance on China for Ga	Net Reliance on Imports for Ge	Import Reliance on China for Ge
U.S.	100%	53%	>50%	54%
E.U.	98%	71%	42%	45%

 

Sources: The United States Geological Survey Mineral Commodities Survey (2023); The European Commission Study on the critical raw materials for the EU (2023)

 

An Escalating Technology Trade War

 

China’s action comes as it has been openly sparring with the U.S. in an escalating technology trade war. The export controls on gallium and germanium are widely seen as retaliation for the U.S. government’s restrictions on sales of advanced semiconductors and chip-making equipment to Chinese companies.

 

As well as its own export controls, the U.S. has been putting pressure on partners such as Japan, South Korea and the Netherlands to limit their sales. The Netherlands, for example, recently implemented controls on the export of advanced semiconductor manufacturing equipment to China from ASML. ASML is currently the only company in the world to produce extreme ultraviolet lithography machines used to produce leading-edge chips.

 

Given the reliance of American and European firms on Chinese supplies of gallium and germanium, experts are worried about the effect China’ new controls could have on aerospace & defense, energy, telecommunications and other industries affected. Moreover, there is the potential future threat to rare earth elements (REEs), the supply of which China also dominates. REEs are crucial for clean energy technologies, electric vehicles, consumer electronics, and national defense.

 

Gallium-Related Products Facing Export Controls

 

Gallium occurs in very small concentrations in ores of other metals. Most gallium is produced as a byproduct of processing bauxite, and the remainder is produced from zinc-processing residues. The metal is not currently recyclable and there is no substitute for its use in some products where increased semiconductor performance and efficiency are required.

 

Aside from gallium metal itself, China’s new controls will apply to several gallium-related products:

 

Material	Usage Examples
Gallium arsenide (GaAs)	Uses include as a doping material to manufacture compound semiconductor wafers used in integrated circuits (ICs) and optoelectronic devices, which include laser diodes, light-emitting diodes (LEDs), photodetectors, solar cells, and solid-state devices such as transistors. While several substitutes for GaAs do exist, no effective substitutes exist for GaAs in many defense-related applications where GaAs-based chips are used because of their unique properties.
Gallium nitride (GaN)	Uses have been growing in importance because of its ability to offer significantly improved performance across a wide range of applications while reducing the energy and the physical space needed to deliver that performance when compared with conventional silicon technologies. For example, GaN is used in advanced radars such as the AN/TPQ-53 which has been provided to the US military.
Gallium phosphide (GaP)	Uses include as a semiconductor and optical material for the manufacture of low and standard brightness red, orange, and green light-emitting diodes.
Gallium antimonide (GaSb)	Uses include as a compound semiconductor for infra-red (IR) photodetectors used in sensing and imaging applications. The application of GaSb detectors is extensive, encompassing military, industrial, medical, and environmental uses.
Gallium oxide (Ga2O3)	Uses take advantage of conduction and luminescence properties; this includes in semiconductors, gas sensing, catalysis, and nanostructures as blue and UV light emitters. Ga2O3 is also ued in spectroscopic analysis.
Gallium selenide (GaSe)	Uses include as a nonlinear optical material for frequency conversion of laser light and as a photoconductor.
Indium gallium arsenide (InGaAs)	Uses include within photodetectors and short-wave infrared imaging (SWIR) devices, solar cells, high-speed electronics, and medical imaging.

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Germanium-Related Products Facing Export Controls

 

The major use of germanium worldwide is for fiber-optic systems, whereby germanium is added to the pure silica glass core of fiber-optic cables to increase their refractive index, minimizing signal loss over long distances.

 

The available resources of germanium are associated with certain zinc and lead-zinc-copper sulfide ores. On a global scale, as little as 3% of the germanium contained in zinc concentrates is recovered. Significant amounts of germanium are contained in ash and flue dust generated in the combustion of certain coals for power generation.

 

Germanium is more available than gallium, with around 30% of global supply produced from recycled materials. However, there is a notable lack of information surrounding the mineral. According to the 2023 Mineral Commodity Summaries published by the U.S. Geological Survey, no data was available pertaining to world refinery production and reserves of germanium.

 

In addition to germanium metal, ingots, and substrates, China’s new controls will also apply to several germanium products:

 

Material	Usage Examples
Germanium dioxide (GeO2)	Uses include in phosphors, transistors, diodes, infrared-transmitting glass, and electroplating.
Germanium tetrachloride (GeCl4)	A colorless liquid, its uses include as an intermediate in the production of purified germanium dioxide and germanium metal. GeCl4 is transparent to infrared light and therefore useful in optical materials. It is also widely used as a semiconductor and as an alloying agent.
Zinc germanium phosphide (ZnGeP2)	Uses include in high power, high frequency applications and in laser diodes, especially as a component for the laser source of infrared countermeasure systems in military aircraft which protect aircraft from heat-seeking missiles.

 

Substitutes for germanium do exist (e.g., silicon in certain electronic applications and antimony/titanium are substitutes for use as polymerization catalysts), providing a degree of resilience to undercut supplies to global markets.

 

Government and Company Actions to Manage Strategic Risks

 

Given the geopolitical context for China’s controls on gallium and germanium exports, and the concentration of global supply, there will inevitably have to be problem solving at the government level to address any shortages. Countries can bolster their resilience by maintaining strategic stockpiles, identifying alternate suppliers, investing in domestic extraction or production, or promoting the expansion of the industry via incentives for the private sector.

 

South Korea serves as a prime example; officials there reported that the short-term effects on operations in their country would be limited due in part to stockpiling and alternative supplies. The Korea Mine Rehabilitation and Mineral Resources Corporation has approximately 40 days’ stockpile of gallium that domestic manufacturers could use.

 

Meanwhile, the E.U. is engaging with countries in South America to secure further access the region’s abundant raw materials. If the E.U. can successfully expand its partnership with the Southern Common market (MERCOSUR), it would help achieve its strategic goal of securing a diversified, affordable, and sustainable supply of critical raw materials.

 

At the same time, the E.U. intends to bolster domestic production through recently proposed legislation such as the Critical Raw Materials Act.

 

While governments must step in to secure their countries’ respective supply chains, companies can ill afford to sit idly by and not take proactive steps to secure their direct supply chain. Although relatively few companies would be in a position to invest in REE or critical commodity extraction or production, they can still benefit from identifying where these materials are sourced from within their ecosystem.

This type of visibility deep into the supply chain can help uncover concentrated reliance on a supplier or region, and the information leveraged to pursue de-risking methods such as supply base diversification to bolster resilience against certain risks.

 

With its artificial intelligence-based software, Interos is well positioned to support supply chain risk management programs for companies around the world trying to address this issue, as well as future disruptions that may arise.

G7 leaders meeting in Hiroshima, Japan this past weekend were hardly short of major global issues to discuss. From Russia’s unprovoked war in Ukraine and the proliferation of nuclear weapons to the steady march of climate change — the potential scope of the agenda was vast. So it was significant that the leaders devoted part of the summit’s agenda and communiqué to the risks facing critical supply chains and the need for greater resilience.

Nowhere is this more concerning for the world economy than in the case of Taiwan. We are at a time of heightened tensions between the United States and China. An all-powerful President Xi Jinping is intent on reuniting the two rival Chinese republics. Consequently, the concentration of semiconductor manufacturing in Taiwan is the biggest geopolitical risk facing supply chains today.

Taiwan-based companies control more than 90% of the world’s production of advanced microchips. These chips are used in everything from high-end smartphones to cutting-edge military hardware. One company, Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co. (TSMC), dominates this niche and owns more than half of global chip-making market share.

A Chinese invasion or blockade of its neighbor across the Taiwan Strait would have a devastating impact on the global economy — one far greater in scale and longevity than the havoc wrought on food and energy supplies by Vladimir Putin’s aggression last year. So it is right that G7 leaders focused on the issue.

Taiwan’s Supply Chain: Powered by Semiconductor Exports

Taiwan exported $479.4 billion of products in 2022. The U.S. was the second biggest importer after China, with 15.7% ($74.9 billion) of the total. Japan was fourth with 7% behind Hong Kong, while the other five G7 countries — Canada, Germany, France, Italy and the U.K. — made up a combined 4.3% ($20.9 billion).

Many different products are shipped to these and other nations in Asia-Pacific and beyond (see chart). But it is electronic components, and especially “integrated circuits/microassemblies” — in other words, semiconductors — that dominate the list. The latter accounted for $183.5 billion, or 38% of Taiwan’s total exports by value last year. Despite a falloff in demand for chips in recent months, this figure was up 17.7% on 2021, which in turn was up 22.4% on 2020.

Dependence on Taiwanese supply chains among G7 countries is, as you might expect, extensive. An analysis of Interos’ global database of business relationships shows that:

• U.S. companies have almost 70,000 direct (tier-1) relationships with Taiwanese suppliers. Companies in other G7 member countries have almost 10,000 between them.
• When indirect multi-tier relationships are included, G7 member companies have more than 315,000 tier-2 and 750,000 tier-3 connections to Taiwanese firms.
• Although tier-1 relationships with the two major Taiwanese semiconductor manufacturers, TSMC and United Microelectronics Corp. (UMC), are relatively small in number (led by the U.S. with around 220), as tier-2 and tier-3 suppliers these two companies are present in hundreds of thousands of supply chains in G7 countries.

 

The Likelihood and Impact of China Invading Taiwan

Two key questions that arise from discussions around the China-Taiwan situation are:

1. How likely is it that China will seek to take Taiwan by force, and when might this happen?
2. What impact would Chinese action against Taiwan have on the global economy and supply chains?

Opinions among commentators and analysts on the first question vary widely. Some see an invasion occurring as soon as later in 2023, to sometime in the 2030s, to never. China’s official policy is one of peaceful reunification. However, U.S. intelligence reports suggest that President Xi has ordered the People’s Liberation Army to develop capabilities to seize the island by military force by 2027.

A geopolitical risk assessment of conflict between China and Taiwan by Interos concluded that the likelihood of an invasion in the next 2-5 years was “roughly even odds (45-55%).” The assessment also noted that “the majority consensus [among government policy makers and think-tank experts] appears to be that there will be an armed conflict over the island.”

On the second question, Interos’ analysis identified that a partial blockade or full invasion could disrupt ocean and air cargo shipments from Taiwan. Our analysis also raised the possibility that Taiwan could be completely cut off from international trade.

Potential Supply Chain Scenarios for Semiconductor Disruption

A tabletop exercise conducted last year among U.S. government and business leaders by the RAND Corporation centered specifically on the likely impact to advanced semiconductor supply chains. Participants were asked to consider two potential scenarios in which China imposed a “coercive quarantine on Taiwan”:

1. Uncontested, China acquires a significant portion of global semiconductor capacity. This leaves the U.S. and other countries with a choice of continuing to buy from Taiwanese suppliers or imposing sanctions on China.
2. China faces resistance in its attempts to take control of Taiwan’s fabs. This leads to a rapid loss of access to the country’s semiconductors, and triggers U.S. and other government action to ration limited supplies.

Unpalatable outcomes from these two scenarios included a fundamental change in the balance of global power in China’s favor, and an extended economic depression for most of the world. Unsurprisingly, given the impact on multiple industries (see graphic), business participants were keen on ensuring continuity of supply even if this meant relying on semiconductor firms such as TSMC under Chinese control.

Military action against China, whether by Taiwan or the U.S. and its allies, was not considered in this simulation. But a recent assessment by The Economist laid bare the imbalance in military capabilities between China and Taiwan. The analysis also articulated the dire consequences of military conflict over the island state. This included “incalculable damage to the world economy” as a result of disruption to semiconductor supply chains.

The threat of war looms large over the Indo-Pacific region. Hence efforts in recent weeks by Japan and other G7 countries, including the U.S., to take some of the heat out of relations with China. In their communiqué, the G7 leaders emphasized that actions designed to boost economic and supply chain resilience were about “de-risking, not de-coupling” from China.

Some Major Players Begin Diversifying Chip Capacity Away From Taiwan

In practice, de-risking means diversification. Since their 2022 meeting in Germany, the response of G7 countries to semiconductor concentration risk has been to tempt advanced chip-making capacity away from Taiwan through vast public subsidies. The U.S. has led the way with its CHIPS and Science Act, but Japan, the European Union, and the U.K. have all followed suit, albeit with fewer billions of dollars to throw at the problem.

Over the next five years these industrial policies should result in new fabs, supply chains, and skilled workforces being developed in multiple geographies. However, Taiwan is set on keeping much of its domestic semiconductor “shield” intact, both in terms of manufacturing and R&D. Aside from contributing 15% of Taiwan’s GDP, the industry serves as vital leverage for Taiwan in its efforts to maintain independence from China.

Confidence in this strategy in waning in some quarters.  \Warren Buffett’s Berkshire Hathaway recently announced that it had sold the remainder of its $4.1 billion stake in TSMC. This is in spite of the fact that the shares were purchased as recently as November last year — and that TSMC is regarded as one of the world’s best-managed companies.

“I don’t like its location,” Buffett told analysts. “I feel better about the capital that we’ve got deployed in Japan than in Taiwan.”

Action CPOs Should Take to Prepare for Potential Disruption

To reduce the exposure of their organizations to semiconductor concentration risk, chief procurement officers should do the following:

• Assess your dependence on Taiwan by understanding the relationships you have with Taiwanese suppliers. Include both the direct, tier-1 relationships and those at tiers 2, 3 and beyond. Chip makers such as TSMC and UMC are often present at this sub-tier level.
• Evaluate the extent to which key semiconductors, electronic components, and other items you depend on from Taiwan-linked supply chains are single- or sole-sourced. Identify where you have viable alternative options already in place.
• Develop a strategy aimed at diversifying your supply base to other geographies. Consider sourcing from new suppliers and/or by working with existing partners to utilize alternate and emerging capacity.
• Conduct scenario plans and risk simulations – like the one run by British telecommunications group BT last year. These can gauge the impact that disruption to Taiwanese semiconductor supply chains might have on your business.
• Continuously monitor your Taiwan-dependent supply chains for geopolitical, operational, financial, and cyber risk events.

Until new semiconductor capacity comes online in the U.S., Japan, Germany, South Korea, and elsewhere, companies will continue to over-rely on Taiwan-based suppliers. However, it is important to be prepared for, and to support the creation of, a more diversified global supply chain for microchips – as it is with other critical products and raw materials that are heavily concentrated in particular geographic locations.

By Geraint John

North American and European companies have been urged to ensure that they are not inadvertently supporting Russia’s war effort in Ukraine by facilitating trade through third-party intermediaries.

A year on from its invasion, the U.S. government and the European Union (E.U.) are concerned that Russia is evading stringent sanctions and export controls by importing vital products through neighboring and “friendly” countries.

Earlier this month, the U.S. Departments of Commerce, Treasury, and Justice issued a joint compliance note asking multinational firms to “exercise heightened caution” and be “vigilant in their compliance efforts” to avoid items such as advanced semiconductors and other electronic components ending up in Russian hands.

The E.U., meanwhile, says it is investigating a surge in exports from European companies to customers in countries such as Armenia, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan, which have increased their trade with Russia since sanctions were introduced in March 2022. It is also reportedly planning to ask these countries to enhance their trade monitoring.

A new Interos white paper notes that the number of restrictions on Russian entities – around 2,500 currently active with more than 1,100 imposed in 2022 alone – are “unprecedented in their scale, scope, and breadth.”

Russia Import Restrictions Are Being Circumvented by “Friendly” Countries

Analysis of official trade data by three economists at the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) found “evidence suggestive of intermediated trade via neighboring economies being used to circumvent the sanctions.”

While E.U. and U.K. exports to Russia “dropped sharply” after the imposition of sanctions, exports to Armenia, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan (the CCA3) – part of the Eurasian Customs Union alongside Russia and Belarus – increased by between 15% and 90%.

Shipments to CCA3 countries covering almost 2,000 sanctioned products, including armaments, chemicals, dual-use technologies, and sensitive machinery, rose by an additional 30% relative to other goods, according to the EBRD. U.S. exports to Russia and the CCA3 followed a similar pattern last year, albeit at lower volumes.

At the same time, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan and Georgia all recorded “significant increases” in exports to Russia (see chart). This, says the EBRD paper, suggests that new supply chains have been set up to channel sanctioned products to Russia from these countries, “not necessarily with the knowledge of the Western exporter.”

But direct sales to Russia also remain a concern. This week, PBS News accused a major American machine-tool manufacturer of flouting export controls by supplying a Russian distributor with vital spare parts, which could be used for military purposes, for months after those controls were imposed last year.

Exports to Russia From Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, and Georgia – January 2020-August 2022

Separate analysis by the Silverado Policy Accelerator, a U.S. non-profit organization, published in January argued that former Soviet states “have become key transshipment points for goods that are ultimately sent to Russia.”

It also noted that Russia had significantly increased its imports from non-sanctioning countries such as China and Turkey. These included semiconductors (see chart), machinery, and heavy trucks, as well as consumer goods such as smartphones and domestic appliances.

Exports of Integrated Circuits to Russia From China and Hong Kong – January-November 2022

In recent months, U.S. officials have called on China, Turkey, South Africa, and the United Arab Emirates ( UAE), among other countries, not to help Russia evade its sanctions.

Together with their E.U. and U.K. counterparts they are also reported to have visited the UAE to express concern that it is becoming a key shipment hub for electronic components and other sensitive products being re-exported to Russia.

The E.U. recently imposed sanctions on a Dubai-based subsidiary of the Russian state-owned shipping company Sovcomflot, a key player in supporting the country’s energy revenues, as part of a new package of measures.

Russian Interests and Indirect Business Relationships

Russian ownership of foreign entities is one potential type of supply conduit of sanctioned goods into the country.

Interos’ global relationship platform highlights 166 entities based in the UAE that are wholly or partially owned by Russian interests.

Similar numbers are located in both Armenia and Hong Kong, according to the data, although these are dwarfed by the thousands of entities registered in European countries such as the Czech Republic, U.K., Germany, Latvia, Bulgaria, and Italy.

Another source of supply is links between Western firms and intermediaries in countries accused of supplying Russia’s war effort. Our analysis here reveals:

• Almost 700 relationships between Russian end customers and 170-plus distinct suppliers in China, Turkey, India, Uzbekistan, and other Central Asian countries.
• More than 8,100 relationships between these suppliers and over 1,750 distinct Western firms in the U.S., Canada, E.U., and U.K.

What this shows is that the global network to support deliberate or inadvertent illicit trade with Russia – so-called “supply chain washing” – is extensive and the risks of breaching sanctions and export controls are high.

“Red Flags” to Watch Out For

In their “tri-seal compliance note” published on 2 March, the U.S. Department of Commerce (DOC), Department of the Treasury and Department of Justice (DOJ) urged companies to be on the lookout for “warning signs of potential sanctions or export violations.”

It listed 13 common “red flags” to watch for, including:

• The use of shell companies to obscure ownership, origin, and funding sources
• A reluctance by customers to share information on product end-use
• Last-minute changes to shipping instructions
• The use of residential addresses and personal e-mail accounts
• Transactions with entities that have little or no web presence
• Routing of products through transshipment points in China, Turkey, Armenia, and other countries that have boosted trade with Russia.

The note emphasizes that the DOJ “has pursued criminal charges against those who it alleges are using front companies and intermediate transshipment points to evade Russia-related U.S. sanctions and export controls”.

Separately, the DOC’s Bureau of Industry and Security has published a compendium of its investigations into sanctions busting in several countries, including Russia, to illustrate the legal and financial penalties that can result from non-compliance.

A group of E.U. countries, including France and Germany, has also recently been pushing for tougher action against companies found to be circumventing sanctions and aiding Russia’s war effort.

A Call to Action to Uphold Russia Import Restrictions

In the light of these warnings and developments, procurement, supply chain, and business leaders at Western companies should:

• Screen both existing and new customers using the latest U.S., E.U. and other restrictions lists – information that is updated regularly on Interos’ Resilience platform.
• Understand the direct and indirect relationships their organizations have with firms in high-risk intermediary countries for sensitive and sanctioned products.
• Ensure that their due diligence and risk management programs empower staff to report any concerns and potential breaches of sanctions rules in a timely manner.

Although Russia has clearly been able to obtain many products from alternative sources in the year since Western sanctions were massively stepped up, there is little doubt it is paying a high price (literally) for Vladimir Putin’s actions.

Stories about microchips being removed from washing machines and other consumer products to supply its military machine suggest that its ability to weather the ever-growing list of restrictions has been limited so far.

However, as the war drags on further into its second year, alternate supply chains may begin to pick up more of the slack – hence the current focus and call to action by U.S. and European governments directed at companies around the world.

By Geraint John

Restrictions on global free trade and supply chain relationships are flying around like Chinese “spy” balloons over North America were just a few weeks ago.

Last month, China slapped sanctions on U.S. defense giants Lockheed Martin and Raytheon, ostensibly because of their arms sales to Taiwan. But the move was widely interpreted as retaliation for the U.S. government’s decision a few days earlier to blacklist six Chinese companies it accuses of being involved in China’s surveillance-balloon program.

So far this month, the American military has shot down one high-altitude Chinese balloon and three unidentified objects over U.S. and Canadian airspace. China denies U.S. government claims that the balloon was spying on sensitive installations. Their government claims it was used purely for weather monitoring.

Regardless of whose version is true, these tit-for-tit sanctions are part of an escalating technology war between the U.S. and its allies and China that threatens to blow apart the international trading system as we know it.

Global Trade Restrictions Have Increased Sharply

As with geopolitical tensions, trade restrictions on goods, services and foreign investment have increased sharply in recent years. From 2018, when the Trump administration imposed tariffs of up to 25% on many Chinese imports, to December 2022, the number of worldwide restrictions more than doubled to around 2,500, according to data from the International Monetary Fund and Global Trade Alert.

A new Interos white paper reveals that Russia displaced China as the most targeted country for restrictions last year, following its invasion of Ukraine. More than 1,100 restrictions were imposed on Russian entities in 2022 – almost six times more than China.

Russia is also well ahead of Iran and China in terms of the total number of restrictions imposed by other nations since 1981 (see chart).

On the opposite side, the U.S. dwarfs other countries in the number of restrictions it issues (around 8,000 during the past 40 years). And it has dozens of restricted entity lists across different government departments and industry sectors.

Prominent examples include:

• The Department of Commerce’s Entity List, which sets out export licensing requirements for hundreds of foreign-owned businesses.
• Sections 889 and 5949 of the National Defense Authorization Act banning the use of certain Chinese products and services for military purposes.
• The Department of Homeland Security’s UFLPA Entity List for the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act, which bars imports of tainted products from the Xinjiang region of China.

Keeping up to date with the ever-expanding list of prohibited firms and ensuring your organization doesn’t fall foul of new trade rules has become a more complex task. Which is why restrictions risk is one of the six risk factors captured and updated continually in Interos’ Resilience platform.

Implications for Global Supply Chains in Light of Trade Sanctions Against China

Standing back from the detail of these multiple lists and regulations, it’s important to consider the broader implications of the spiraling number of restrictions on international supply chains.

During the past couple of years, the U.S. has implemented progressively tighter and more far-reaching rules around the sourcing of Chinese components and sales of American semiconductors and chip-making equipment to Huawei and other Chinese tech firms.

This is having a dramatic impact on the ability of these companies to scale up production and manufacture products.

Last month, China’s semiconductor industry body issued a strongly worded statement condemning action by the U.S., Japan, and the Netherlands to deny its members vital equipment.

Such measures would “destroy the global semiconductor ecosystem”, it claimed.

Trade Restrictions on China Signal Broader Supply Chain Trend

While complaining loudly and portraying itself as the defender of free trade and globalization – as it did at the World Economic Forum’s meeting of political and business leaders in Davos in January — China is also flexing its trade-restriction muscles.

It has, for example, threatened to stop the export of solar panel manufacturing equipment to the U.S. China dominates the supply chain for this crucial clean-energy technology and could — in a mirror image of its own semiconductor woes — impede American efforts to beef up its domestic solar industry.

Although trade between China and the U.S. grew strongly last year, economists and other critics argue that protectionism, “decoupling,” and politically led moves towards “friend-shoring” (or “ally-shoring”) could have negative consequences for the global economy and supply chains in the years ahead.

These include higher prices, lower efficiency, less innovation, wasted public money through ineffective subsidies and industrial policies, and diminished levels of resilience.

As FT columnist Martin Wolf cautioned in a piece on the “new interventionism” last month: “Fragmentation is very easy to start. But it will be hard to control and even harder to reverse.”

Get more information on trade restrictions, sanctions, regulatory changes and their impact on the global supply chain by reading our latest white paper – the Red Tape Revolution.